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Abstract 
We investigate the possibility that victims and transgressors are predictably miscalibrated in their 
interpretation of a transgression, and that this has important implications for the process of 
forgiveness. Across five studies, we find that victims underestimate how much transgressors 
desire forgiveness. This is driven by a two-part mediating mechanism: First, victims are more 
likely than transgressors to see the transgression as intentional and, second, this causes victims to 
believe transgressors feel less guilty than transgressors report feeling. Ultimately, this chain of 
asymmetries stymies the processes of forgiveness because victims tend to withhold forgiveness 
from those who actually desire it. The predicted effect emerged in the context of scenario studies 
(Studies 3 and 5), a real transgression that occurred in the lab (Study 4), transgressions from 
participants’ pasts (Study 1), and transgressions from the same day (Study 2). In Study 4, we 
describe a new procedure in which one participant commits a real transgression against another 
participant, providing an effective means for researchers to study real-time transgressions from 
the perspective of both parties involved. Furthermore, in Study 5, we found that when victims 
were encouraged to empathize with the transgressor, the asymmetries were attenuated, 
suggesting a means of overcoming this impediment to forgiveness.  
 Keywords:  forgiveness, guilt, transgression, intent, conflict, empathy  
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Impediments to Forgiveness: Victim and Transgressor Attributions of Intent and Guilt 
When Tom Tate and five of his fellow Royal Air Force (RAF) crew bailed out of a 
burning aircraft over Germany in 1945, they couldn’t have known how unfortunate the location 
was. An RAF bombing campaign had recently killed a quarter of Pforzheim’s 72,000 inhabitants. 
People were looking for revenge. That night, a commandant of the Hitler Youth directed a group 
of his members to execute the captured crew. Egged on by an angry mob, the group carried out 
their orders. Only Mr. Tate managed to escape by running off at an opportune moment; he was 
later captured by German soldiers and spent the rest of the war as a prisoner. For the next fifty 
years, Mr. Tate’s anger about what had happened in Pforzheim was so great that he swore he 
would never return to the country that had transgressed against him.  
But in 1995, he did return. By chance, Mr. Tate was reading about a golf vacation in a 
magazine and came across an article about Pforzheim. He read about an annual commemorative 
ceremony that took place at a cathedral where a plaque reading “Father Forgive” listed the names 
of the airmen who had been killed. The ceremony was a way for the townspeople to seek 
forgiveness for the war crime. He read that even one of the Hitler Youth members who had been 
responsible for the killing had attended the first ceremony, seeking some form of forgiveness. 
Eventually, Mr. Tate decided to visit. Of his trip, he said: “Guilt had hung over the village for 
years, but by going there it somehow changed things for them. I was so welcomed, and so well 
looked after, that suddenly I realized I’d made a mistake. I wish that I’d gone to Germany earlier 
to relieve these people of their guilt. When someone comes with arms open to embrace you, you 
can’t feel enmity any more. The act of friendship invites forgiveness” (Tate, 2010).  
This story communicates much about the cycle of transgression and repair, and the 
critical role of forgiveness. One feature we want to highlight, however, is the discrepancy 
Impediments to Forgiveness 4 
between the beliefs that Mr. Tate held about the people of Pforzheim before his visit and the 
Pforzheim residents’ actual experience. As a victim, Mr. Tate underestimated his transgressors’ 
desire for forgiveness, and this miscalibration left the relationship unrepaired for many years. We 
propose that such miscalibration is not unique to this story, but is instead a fundamental feature 
of transgressions, rooted in the different roles that victims and transgressors inhabit. In Mr. 
Tate’s case, the miscalibration was rectified by his chance viewing of a magazine article. But 
what if, as so often happens after a transgression, the victim had avoided the transgressor 
(Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2009; McCullough et al., 1998) and never learned of his or her 
desire to be forgiven? In such cases, the fact that victims underestimate transgressors’ desires for 
forgiveness would mean that many relationships that could be repaired by forgiveness are instead 
left damaged.  
In the current research, we develop a theoretical rationale for why victims reliably 
underestimate transgressors’ desires for forgiveness. Drawing on the actor-observer bias 
literature, we propose that victims are more likely than transgressors to see the act as intentional, 
which then translates into asymmetric perceptions of how guilty the transgressor feels, and 
ultimately to victims ascribing lower desires for forgiveness than transgressors report wanting. In 
the following sections, we first situate our core prediction within the broader forgiveness 
literature. We then outline the mechanisms of intent and guilt that we propose give rise to this 
miscalibration effect. Finally, we introduce a moderator — empathy — that may serve to 
attenuate the miscalibration. 
Asymmetries in Forgiveness 
Forgiveness has been identified as one of the most effective means of repairing 
relationships after a transgression. While a transgression creates a debt that the transgressor owes 
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to the victim, forgiveness communicates the victim’s willingness to forgo that debt and repair the 
relationship (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell & Finkel, 2004). Forgiveness has been 
shown to have beneficial effects on relationships: transgressors are more likely to repent and 
comply with favor requests from victims (Kelln & Ellard, 1999; Struthers, Eaton, Shirvani, 
Georghiou, & Edell, 2008; Wallace, Exline, & Baumeister, 2008). Moreover, victims show 
improved mental and physical health (e.g. Hannon, Finkel, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2012; 
Toussaint & Webb, 2005). Indeed, perhaps because of these benefits, much research has been 
devoted to shedding light on when forgiveness is more or less likely to be offered. By and large, 
this line of research focuses on the victim’s psychology. For example, in their meta-analysis of 
the extant research, Fehr and colleagues (2010) proposed and tested three drivers of forgiveness: 
cognition (what the victim thinks about the transgressor and transgression), affect (how the 
victim feels after the transgression), and situational constraints (how embedded the victim is in 
the relationship with the transgressor).  
 Although this research provides valuable insights, focusing on the victim’s role in the 
process of forgiveness only communicates part of the story. Our research takes a broader, more 
interactional perspective. Rather than asking when victims forgive, we investigate whether 
victims and transgressors are calibrated in the psychological processes leading up to forgiveness. 
In an ideal world, victims would offer forgiveness to those who desire it, rather than offering it to 
transgressors who do not want it, or withholding it from transgressors who desire it. Recent 
findings suggest that one type of miscalibration - victims who overestimate how much 
transgressors want forgiveness - can cause damage to the relationship (Adams, Zou, Inesi & 
Pillutla, 2015). In the current research, we explore the psychology underlying the opposite 
miscalibration: victims who underestimate how much transgressors desire forgiveness. By 
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looking into victims’ and transgressors’ psychological representations of transgressions, we can 
obtain some sense of whether forgiveness is being offered in the right circumstances.  
To test for victim-transgressor calibration, we look at both victims’ and transgressors’ 
beliefs about transgressors’ desires for forgiveness. We ask: are victims correct in their beliefs 
about transgressors’ desires? Recent research suggests that victims’ belief about how much 
transgressors want forgiveness is strong predictor of their intention to express forgiveness 
(Adams & Inesi, 2016). Therefore, by understanding both perspectives, we can begin to 
understand whether victims offer forgiveness to those who want it, or if there is a fundamental 
inefficiency in the system.  
In the current research, we test the proposition that victims reliably underestimate how 
much transgressors desire forgiveness, and that this miscalibration is rooted in the role that each 
party plays and the asymmetric attributions generated by these roles. We explore these 
attributions in the next section. 
Mechanisms 
Asymmetric Perceptions of Intentionality 
In the context of a transgression, victims and transgressors inhabit different social roles: 
transgressors commit the violation and victims experience it. These roles in many ways echo 
those described in the actor-observer bias literature, which suggests that – through their different 
roles and perspectives – actors and observers generate predictably different attributions for 
actors’ behavior. Specifically, observers are more likely to attribute actors’ behavior to 
dispositional factors than the actors themselves are (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). The actor-observer 
asymmetry has been explained by the different information available to each party when making 
sense of the actor’s behavior (Kelley, 1967) and the different ways that information is processed 
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(Jones & Nisbett, 1971). For example, behaviors and actions are more salient to observers than 
actors, whereas environmental triggers are more salient to actors. Thus, observers are more likely 
to make internal attributions to actors (vis-à-vis the environment), while actors tend to attribute 
their behaviors to the situation. This asymmetry has been shown in a wide variety of contexts, 
from the types of language used in romantic relationships (Fiedler, Semin, Finkenauer, & Berkel, 
1995) to descriptions of own versus friends’ choices of college majors (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, 
& Marecek, 1973). Furthermore, although a recent meta-analysis found little support for a 
difference between actors’ and observers’ attributions for positive actions, the effect was robust 
for negative actions (Malle, 2006), which we examine in the current research. 
We propose that the actor-observer asymmetry has important implications in the context 
of transgressions. Specifically, the attributional biases that emerge between actors and observers 
will also emerge in the context of interpersonal transgressors. In fact, the bias may be 
particularly pronounced because victims are active observers (i.e., involved in the focal action) 
rather than passive observers (i.e., not part of the actor’s situation). Jones and Nisbett (1971) 
theorized that the tendency for observers to make dispositional attributions is stronger for active 
observers than for passive observers because active observers must respond to the situation and 
are therefore under time pressure. Supporting our prediction about these role-based biases 
emerging in the context of interpersonal transgressions, Chaiken and Darley (1973) found that 
participants who took the victim’s role in a scenario generated different (and more dispositional) 
attributions for the transgression compared to participants who took the transgressor’s role.  
In sum, victims should be more likely to attribute the transgression to dispositional 
factors. More specifically, we predict that victims will be more likely than transgressors to see 
the transgression as intentional (i.e., believe that the transgression was caused by the 
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transgressor’s desire, belief, intention, awareness, and ability to transgress, Kearns & Fincham, 
2005; Malle & Knobe, 1997). Our prediction assumes that the transgressor’s actual intention to 
transgress is not known to the victim, who must engage in a sense-making process. Although 
research has tended to study interpersonal transgressions as if the transgressor’s intentions were 
fully known and transparent to the victim (e.g. Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchimaya, & Shirvani, 
2008), such transparency is not the case for most real transgressions. In reality, victims must 
deduce transgressors’ intentions using the attributional processes described above. Thus, to 
develop our theory and predictions, we focus our inquiry on transgressions where intentionality 
is not fully transparent, which we believe represent the majority of real-world interpersonal 
transgressions.  
At the same time, our predicted asymmetry in attributions of intent should be smaller 
when transgressions are completely intentional. Indeed, Malle and colleagues propose that 
asymmetries in person-situation attributions do not emerge when an actor’s behavior is perceived 
as completely intentional (e.g., “She went to the café” or “By choice, Ian worked 14 hours a day 
last month”; Malle, Knobe & Nelson, 2007). Logically, if a transgressor already reports his/her 
actions as totally intentional, then there is no room for a victim to overestimate his/her 
intentionality. 
Asymmetric Perceptions of Transgressor Guilt 
Thus far, we have discussed how the different roles that victims and transgressors inhabit 
lead to asymmetric attributions in transgressor intent. How would this ultimately result in victims 
underestimating transgressors’ desires for forgiveness? We believe that asymmetric perceptions 
of transgressor guilt play a critical mediating role.  
Impediments to Forgiveness 9 
Guilt is a frequently studied moral emotion that arises in response to transgressions. It has 
been defined as an aversive emotional state resulting from a negative outcome (e.g., a 
transgression or wrongdoing) for which one feels responsible and includes the perception that 
one has breached one’s personal standards or violated a norm (McGraw, 1997; Roseman, 1984; 
Scherer, 1984; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; 
Wiltermuth & Cohen, 2014). The literature on guilt (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) 
suggests that it is an emotion that arises from one’s behavior (“I did a bad thing”). In contrast, 
shame, a related self-conscious emotion, arises from more global attributions about the self (“I’m 
a bad person”). Moreover, whereas guilt is associated with the motivation to repair relationships 
following transgressions, shame is associated with withdrawal from relationships (Tangney, 
1991). Therefore, due to our primary interest in the psychological processes leading up to 
forgiveness, we investigated guilt as the mechanism leading to increased desires to address the 
transgression and repair the relationship. 
Prior research has shown that transgressor guilt is directly linked to intentionality. 
Specifically, the more intentional a transgression, the less guilt the transgressor experiences 
(McGraw, 1997; Leunissen, DeCremer, Reinders Folmer, & van Dijke, 2013). This may be 
because transgressors who intend to cause harm see their actions as justifiable and therefore do 
not perceive themselves to have breached a moral standard or norm (McGraw, 1997). The notion 
that transgressors who intend to cause harm subsequently experience less guilt is also shared by 
victims. In two studies using both recalled real transgressions and hypothetical transgressions, 
participants who were randomly assigned to perpetrator and victim roles reported that the 
perpetrator experienced greater guilt after an accidental compared to an intentional transgression 
(McGraw, 1997). Therefore, if both victims and transgressors link transgressor intent with 
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transgressor guilt, then the miscalibration we predicted earlier for transgressor intent should 
carry over into guilt: victims will underestimate the amount of guilt that transgressors 
experience. Indeed, in the opening example, Mr. Tate’s quotation shows that his experience is 
consistent with this prediction: as a victim, he seemed surprised by the amount of guilt 
experienced by Pforzheim’s residents (the transgressors) and wished he could have addressed it 
earlier.  
Guilt and Desires for Forgiveness. As mentioned, an important downstream 
consequence of guilt that distinguishes it from other moral emotions such as shame and outrage 
is the activation of a desire to repair the relationship with the victim (e.g. Tangney, 1991). For 
example, guilt-proneness correlates with greater tendencies to apologize (Howell, Turowski, & 
Buro, 2012) and state guilt has been related to both a higher self-reported likelihood of 
apologizing (Leunissen et al., 2013) as well as a higher likelihood of altering the behavioral 
pattern that led to the transgression (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). More pertinent 
to the current research, transgressors who feel guilty show a greater desire for forgiveness. A 
longitudinal study showed that at time 1, guilt (but not shame) predicted forgiveness-seeking 
behaviors at time 2 (Riek, Luna, & Schnabelrauch, 2014). In this way, transgressor guilt serves 
as the key psychological stepping-stone between intent and desires for forgiveness. Our full 
model therefore proposes that victims overestimate transgressor intent relative to transgressors, 
which translates into their underestimation of transgressor guilt, and ultimately victims’ 
underestimation of transgressors’ desire for forgiveness.  
Empathy as a Remedy 
Given the many benefits of relationship repair and of forgiveness in particular, we sought 
a possible remedy to correct the miscalibration between victims and transgressors in desires for 
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forgiveness. We identified empathy, defined as the ability to perceive what another person is 
feeling (Levenson & Ruef, 1992). If the asymmetry can be reduced or even eliminated, then this 
could provide not only a better understanding of the mechanism, but also a means of hastening 
relationship repair after a transgression.  
According to the information-processing explanation for the actor-observer bias (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1971), dispositional or personal factors of the actor are relatively more salient to 
observers than to actors, whereas aspects of the situation are relatively less salient to observers. 
This role-based difference in perception leads to observers being more likely to generate 
dispositional attributions for actors’ behavior. Jones and Nisbett theorized that if the observer 
empathizes with the actor, the asymmetric attributional pattern would be less pronounced: the 
observer would shift her attentional focus, would be more attentive to situational factors, and 
therefore would be less likely to generate dispositional attributions. Regan and Totten (1975) 
found support for this prediction. Although their theory focused more broadly on perspective-
taking, they operationalized this construct through empathy. Indeed, empathy has been described 
as affective perspective-taking (Denham, 1986, as cited in Galinsky et al., 2006) because the 
process of empathizing requires imagining how another person is feeling. In the current research, 
we explore the possibility that asking a victim to empathize with the transgressor will lead them 
to attribute less intentionality to the transgressor’s actions. This should then lead victims to 
believe that the transgressor experiences greater guilt and wants greater forgiveness, thereby 
reducing asymmetries between the two parties. 
The Present Research 
We tested our hypotheses across five studies in which we randomly assigned participants 
to think about transgressions from the perspective of either victims or perpetrators. In all studies, 
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we tested the hypothesized asymmetry in beliefs about transgressors’ desires for forgiveness, and 
explored attributions of transgressor intent and guilt as mechanisms responsible for this 
asymmetry. In Study 1 we studied participants’ recollections of their own past experiences with 
real transgressions and in Study 2, we conducted a longitudinal diary study of transgressions on 
the same day that they occurred. In Studies 3 and 5 we used a scenario procedure, whereas in 
Study 4, we developed a novel laboratory-based paradigm in which participants transgressed 
against or were victimized by another participant. In the final study, we investigated victim 
empathy for the transgressor as one possible means of rectifying the asymmetry.  
All initial sample sizes in the studies we report below were determined a priori, and we 
report all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Across all studies, our datasets are comprised only of participants who completed all measures in 
the survey. Subsequently, we endeavored to exclude participants who were obviously not reading 
materials (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). To do this, we additionally excluded 
people who could not recall a central feature of the scenario when asked or who provided content 
in an essay that duplicated another response or was totally unrelated to the prompt. In Studies 1, 
3, and 5, these criteria led to one participant being excluded from each study. When these 
participants were included in the studies below, the significance of the results did not change. In 
Study 4 (a lab study), no participants were excluded on these grounds because we did not ask the 
attention check questions. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we conducted an initial, ecologically valid test of the prediction that victims 
and transgressors are fundamentally miscalibrated in their reactions to a transgression. We used a 
micro-narrative procedure (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; see also Zechmeister & 
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Romero, 2002) to test our predicted effects in the context of transgressions participants 
experienced in their past. Participants provided a short summary of a past transgression from 
their own lives from the perspective of either the victim or the transgressor. In addition to 
providing external validity, this method allows us to test our hypothesis over a wide variety of 
transgressions.  
Method 
 Participants.  The final sample for this study was 98 MTurk workers (64 men; 34 
women; Mage = 33.73 years).  
 Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to the role of victim or transgressor. 
Participants in the transgressor condition were asked to recall and write about a time they had 
done something that had harmed or offended another person; participants in the victim condition 
were asked to recall and write about a time someone did something that harmed or offended 
them. To increase participants’ psychological involvement, we asked them to type in the initials 
of the person who had harmed them (or whom they had harmed), and then fed this text through 
the dependent measures.  
 Measures.  We measured intentionality, guilt, and desires for forgiveness on scales 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 Intentionality.  To measure intentionality, we asked participants to respond to the item, 
“(Initials) intended to harm or offend me” or “I intended to harm or offend (initials).” 
Guilt.  To measure guilt, we asked participants about their agreement with the statement 
“(Initials) feels guilty about what he/she did” or “I feel guilty about harming or offending 
(initials)”.  
Impediments to Forgiveness 14 
Desires for Forgiveness.  We asked two items to measure transgressors’ desires for 
forgiveness. Transgressors were asked about their agreement with two statements: “I want 
(initials) to express forgiveness for what I did” and “I want to be forgiven by (initials).” Victims 
were asked to predict the extent to which “(Initials) wants me to express forgiveness for what 
he/she did” and “(Initials) wants me to forgive him/her.” These items were highly correlated and 
therefore combined into a composite measure of desires for forgiveness, r(98) = .87, p < .001. 
Results 
 Intentionality.  Victims (M = 5.00, SD = 1.76) thought the transgressor had intended to 
cause harm more than transgressors reported (M = 3.04, SD = 2.30), F(1, 96) = 22.61, p < .001, 
d = .97.  
 Guilt.  Victims (M = 3.20, SD = 1.86) thought their transgressors experienced less guilt 
than transgressors (M = 5.28, SD = 2.03) actually reported experiencing after their 
transgressions, F(1, 96) = 28.12, p < .001, d = 1.07.  
 Forgiveness.  Victims (M = 3.48, SD = 1.91) thought their transgressors wanted to be 
forgiven less than transgressors reported wanting forgiveness (M = 5.13, SD = 2.03), F(1, 96) = 
17.19, p < .001, d = .84. 
 Mediation.  We employed a sequential mediation model that is able to account for a 
causal path through two mediators. We tested for an indirect effect of role on forgiveness 
through intentionality and guilt using PROCESS Model 6 (Hayes, 2013). Using 5,000 
bootstrapped samples, the coefficient was .38 (95% CI .10 to .81). Thus, relative to transgressors, 
victims made higher estimates of how intentional transgressors’ wrongdoings were, which 
caused them to discount how guilty transgressors felt, which resulted in lower estimates of how 
much transgressors wanted to be forgiven (see Figure 1). 
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Supplemental analyses.  We additionally coded the micro-narratives for two different 
purposes. First, we wanted to investigate whether the asymmetry between the victim and 
transgressor regarding the transgressor’s state of mind (intent, guilt, etc.) would spontaneously 
emerge in participants’ descriptions of the transgressions. This is a very conservative test of our 
hypothesis and would mean that individuals do not need to be prompted by questions in order for 
evidence of the asymmetry to emerge in real transgressions. Second, we wanted to test 
alternative explanations that may have spuriously given rise to our findings. Since we were 
relying upon self-generated transgression narratives, we wanted to rule out the possibility that 
any effect could be attributed to systematic differences in the type of transgression being recalled 
by victims and transgressors. Therefore, we also coded the responses for relational closeness 
between the two parties, severity of the transgression, context of the transgression (personal vs. 
professional), and the number of victims and transgressors.  
Coding for intentionality and guilt. We asked two coders (one with three years of 
research experience, the other an undergraduate research assistant who had not coded a project 
before) who were blind to the study’s hypotheses to rate the essays in terms of intentionality and 
guilt. The logic behind this was to see whether third parties would be able to detect differences in 
attributions of intentionality and guilt even before participants were consciously asked to self-
report their own intent and guilt. We did not ask them to code for transgressors’ desires for 
forgiveness because it was not spontaneously mentioned in any micro-narratives. The coders 
rated whether, in the transgressor condition, the respondent intended to harm or offend the 
person they described, or in the victim condition, whether the person they described intended to 
harm or offend the author (0 = no, 1 = yes). We also asked them to code whether the author had 
experienced guilt (or whether the author described the target as having experienced guilt; 0 = no, 
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1 = yes). For both of these, we used the same coding system as Baumeister and colleagues 
(1990); these authors justified the use of binary coding because of the unreliability of more fine-
grained coding schemes in this context. The authors agreed 80% of the time for intent, and 94% 
of the time for guilt (κintent = .68 and κguilt = .91, indicating substantial agreement, Landis & Koch, 
1977). When the authors disagreed, they were asked to discuss and reconcile their coding. The 
coders could not agree on intent in one essay; we excluded it from the analysis. 
Before comparing victims’ and transgressors’ essays, we wanted to get a sense for 
whether the coding results were related to the self-reported results described earlier. Therefore, 
we ran point-biserial correlations and found that coded intent was correlated with participants’ 
later self-reported intent, r(97) = .52, p < .001, and coded guilt was correlated with participants’ 
later self-reported guilt, r(98) = .61, p < .001.  
When comparing transgressors’ and victims’ essays for mentions of intent, we found that 
74.5% of victims said the transgression was intentional according to coders, while 63.0% of 
transgressors reported acting intentionally. Although this was directionally similar to our 
hypothesis, the difference was not statistically significant, Χ2(1, N = 97) = 1.49, p = .222. When 
comparing mentions of guilt in victims’ and transgressors’ essays, we found that whereas coders 
reported no victims discussing whether the transgressor experienced guilt, 63.8% of 
transgressors discussed feeling guilty in their essays, Χ2(1, N = 98) = 46.92, p < .001, providing 
support for our prediction.
1
  
Alternative Explanations. For relational closeness, we asked the coders to respond to the 
question, “How well do the author and the person they describe know each other?” on a scale 
                                                 
1
 We also coded for regret as per Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman (1990) and found the results 
were consistent with our theory: coders rated only 1 victim (2%) as having expressed regret, but 
they coded  60% of transgressors as having experienced regret, Χ2(1, N = 98) = 38.97, p < .001. 
Coded regret correlated highly with coded guilt, 2 = .88, p < .001.  
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ranging from 1 (not at all/complete strangers) to 4 (close friends/family members). The two 
coders were highly reliable, ICC = .98 (as suggested by Hallgren, 2012, we used ICC for 
continuous measure reliability, and κ for dichotomous measures). To code for severity of the 
transgression, we asked coders to answer: “How serious was the harm or offense the participant 
described?” (1 = not at all serious; 7 = extremely serious), ICC = .73. For both the closeness and 
severity measures, we averaged the two coders’ responses to create composite measures. Finally, 
we asked the coders to identify the number of victims and transgressors recalled in the essay 
(only one of the coder’s responses was used because the other proved inaccurate), and whether 
the transgression occurred in a personal or professional context (κ = .69). In some cases, these 
variables could not be coded, but overall, victims and transgressors seemed to recall similar 
transgressions in terms of closeness, the transgression’s severity, the number of people involved, 
and the context, all Fs < 2.52, ps > .116. When we controlled for these characteristics, the effects 
of perspective on participants’ self-reported ascriptions of intent and guilt all remained 
significant, all ps < .001.   
 Discussion 
The way that people describe past transgressions, i.e. the narratives that they construct 
and how they interpret and make sense of wrongdoings, appears to be a function of the role they 
played in the event. Moreover, differences in attributions of intentionality and guilt are, to some 
extent, detectable by third parties even before participants are specifically asked to make these 
attributions. Such differences emerge in response to a wide variety of transgressions above and 
beyond the severity of the transgression, and even when taking into account the closeness of the 
relationship between the two parties. The results of this study provided statistical support for the 
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full theoretical model that differences in victims’ and transgressors’ attributions of intent and 
guilt influence their estimates of transgressors’ desires for forgiveness.  
One potential weakness inherent to the method used in Study 1 is that role assignment 
may have led to different conceptualizations of the transgression. Although external validity and 
generalizability were high, it could be that victims and transgressors generated different types of 
transgressions to write about. For example, from a pool of past transgressions, victims may 
sample on one type of transgression and transgressors a different type. We found that role did not 
affect the severity of the recalled transgression, participants’ familiarity with their counterpart, 
the context in which the transgression occurred, or the number of victims or transgressors 
involved, but there could have been other differences that we did not code for. It is also possible 
that, because victims and transgressors perceive the same event differently, there is a systematic 
difference in the pool of past transgressions that is cognitively available to be called upon. We 
therefore conducted a second study in which participants were asked about transgressions that 
had occurred that day.  
 
Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was, like Study 1, to test our predictions in the context of real 
transgressions that occurred in participants’ lives outside the laboratory. At the same time, we 
wanted to restrict the range of possible experiences that participants could reflect upon to reduce 
the possibility that victims and transgressors were recalling systematically different types of 
transgressions from their past. To do this, we conducted a study using a daily diary method in 
which participants answered questions about transgressions from that day, and did so over a five-
day period. Our procedure is based on Luchies and colleagues’ method (2013), which validated 
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the daily diary method in the context of forgiveness for interpersonal transgressions. We could 
then test this aggregate set of recent transgressions for our predicted asymmetries. By 
constraining the transgressions to the current day (rather than a lifetime, as in Study 1), this 
design reduces the possible pool of transgressions available to choose from. Therefore, it makes 
it less likely that transgressors and victims would select reliably different types of transgressions 
from a given pool of past transgressions. Also, because it is possible that victims’ and 
transgressors’ memories of past transgressions change over time in systematically different ways 
(Luchies et al., 2013), the time constraint in this procedure addresses this potential concern.  
Method 
 We conducted an initial survey to register a maximum of 200 people to participate in a 5-
day longitudinal study; this registration survey was sent to an online pool of participants 
maintained by a behavioral research lab in the UK. We asked participants to sign up for the study 
by clicking a link to a webpage that explained the payment and logistics of the study and asked 
them to provide demographic information. All 188 participants who registered were then 
randomly assigned to a victim or transgressor condition. Participants were paid £1.00 for each 
day that they completed the survey, and an additional £5.00 if they responded to the survey all 5 
days. We included people in the final analysis if they completed at least one diary entry (final n = 
179, 60 men, 119 women, Mage = 27.01 years).  
All registered participants were sent a series of 5 links over 5 days (1 per day) at exactly 
4:00 pm each day. Those in the victim condition always received links that asked them to 
recount any events that had occurred that day in which they were victimized, and those in the 
transgressor condition always received links that asked them to recount any transgressions they 
had committed that day. Specifically, we asked, “Think about the events that have transpired 
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today (date inserted). We are particularly interested in whether you did anything that made 
another person upset, angry, or hurt. Tell us about the incident even if it was very brief, and even 
if you felt fine by the end of it. Did anything like this happen?” If participants clicked “Yes, this 
happened to me today” they were directed to questions regarding how many times that had 
happened to them. In the victim condition, we rephrased the prompt and questions to be 
appropriate to that role. Using the same items as in Study 1, we asked participants to describe an 
incident and to rate intent, guilt, and desires for forgiveness.  
 We additionally asked how close they were to the person in question (1 = not at all close, 
7 = one of the people to whom I feel closest in my life), how frequently they interacted with the 
person (6-point scale ranging from “daily” to “never”), and how serious the consequences of the 
event were (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) in order to control for any possible effects these might 
have on attributions of intent, guilt, and desires for forgiveness. 
Our procedure is slightly different from the typical daily diary method, which asks 
participants to respond before going to bed. Since we conducted the study online and participants 
were sent a new link everyday via email, we modified the procedure to maximize the likelihood 
that people would respond to all five days of the survey. Because people do not necessarily read 
emails as soon as they arrive in their inbox and would not necessarily fill out they survey once 
they read the email, we needed to select a time that would give participants enough time for a 
transgression to have occurred that day, but also give them enough time to fill it out before going 
to sleep. This led to our decision to send the link to the survey at 4:00 pm each day. Since the 
survey took place between Monday and Friday, this might suggest some oversampling of 
workplace transgressions. At the same time, the time stamps of when people completed the 
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survey reveal that 56% of respondents filled it out between 4pm and 7pm and 44% filled it out 
after 7pm, suggesting a fair number of the transgressions may have occurred in the evening.  
Results 
 Out of the 188 people who registered, 179 completed at least one diary entry. Thirty-five 
indicated they had not been victimized or transgressed against during this period, and another 4 
participants said they had been transgressed against but did not provide any further information. 
These 140 participants discussed a total of 257 transgressions (144 victim accounts and 113 
transgressor accounts). Because the data provided by any participant for multiple transgressions 
are not independent, we conducted random-coefficient modeling using the xtmixed function in 
Stata, and represented multiple observations from a given participant as nested within 
participants; this method can also account for missing data from participants. We report R
2
 for 
each effect as proposed by Bryk & Raudenbush (1992) and computed using the mltrsq function 
in Stata.  
There were significant effects of role on attributions of intent, B = -.90, SE(B) = .28, p < 
.001, R
2
 = .15; guilt, B = 1.67, SE(B) = .32, p < .001, R
2
 = .37; and desires for forgiveness, B = 
1.62, SE(B) = .29, p < .001, R
2
 = .29. Means are listed in Table 1. All of these results held when 
simultaneously controlling for the closeness of the relationship, the frequency of interaction, and 
the severity of the transgression, all ps ≤ .038. 
Mediation.  To test the hypothesized indirect effect, we conducted multi-level sequential 
mediation when nesting intent, guilt, and desires for forgiveness within participants (see Figure 
2). We conducted this test of sequential mediation in Mplus using structural equation modeling 
by combining the Mplus codes specified by Preacher and colleagues for multi-level mediation 
(Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010; Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011) and Stride and 
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colleagues’ code for sequential mediation (Stride, Gardner, Catley, & Thomas, 2015) to test the 
effect of role on desires for forgiveness through intent and guilt.  We also tested for normality of 
residuals using the boxcox program in the MASS package (Venables & Ripley, 2002) in R (R 
Core Team, 2015; Venables & Ripley, 2002). To address positive skew, we performed a 
reflected inverse transformation on intent, which we then reverse-scored to put back in its 
original direction. We also performed a square root transformation on guilt to address positive 
skew.
2
 All predictor variables, with the exception of condition, were then standardized for ease 
of interpretation. When we constrained the slopes representing the effects of intent on guilt and 
intent on forgiveness and the slope representing the effect of guilt on forgiveness to be equal to 
the within-slopes coefficients, this test yielded a standardized coefficient of .08 for the indirect 
effect (a1*d*b2) with a 95% CI of (.02 to .14; with the control variables, -.001 to .09). Although 
the 95% CI did include zero with control variables included, the magnitude of the estimated 
effect with and without controls is consistent with a small mediation effect. 
As a secondary test, we followed the original procedure conducted by Luchies and 
colleagues (2013) and created averages of intent, guilt, and forgiveness for all transgressions 
within each participant. When testing for the two-step mediation process with 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples, the bootstrap coefficient was -.24 (SE = .11) and the 95% CI excluded zero (-.50 to -
.06). When controlling for the closeness of the relationship, the frequency of interaction, and the 
severity of the transgression, the 95% CI did not exclude zero (-.02 to .19).     
Discussion 
Even across 257 real transgressions that involved 140 unique individuals, we found 
evidence supporting our hypotheses about asymmetries in intent, guilt, and desires for 
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 These results remain unchanged when not adjusting these variables for skew. 
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forgiveness. The results suggest that there is a fundamental asymmetry in how victims and 
transgressors interpret the same event. However, one strength of both Studies 1 and 2 is also a 
limitation: studying transgressions from participants’ own lives enables us to test whether these 
asymmetries hold across many different types of transgressions in uncontrolled environments, 
but in doing so, we have sacrificed experimental control for generalizability. One weakness 
inherent in both Studies 1 and 2 is that victims and transgressor may perceive transgressions 
differently, meaning that they have different pools of past transgressions to call upon. This 
subtler way of confounding role with transgression can only be addressed by holding the event 
constant. Thus, in the remaining studies, we restricted participants to imagine or experience one 
transgression in order to test our hypotheses in a more controlled environment. 
  
Study 3 
 In Study 3, we tested our hypotheses using a transgression that was the same across all 
participants. Participants imagined that they were either harmed by or caused harm to someone 
else. We then asked them to report how much the transgressor intended to cause harm, how 
much guilt the transgressor experienced, and how much the transgressor desired forgiveness.  
Method 
Participants.  The final sample for this study was 119 workers recruited from Amazon 
MTurk to participate in an online study (82 men; 37 women; Mage = 33.09 years). 
 Procedure.  All participants read a scenario adapted from Leunissen and colleagues 
(2013) in which role (victim vs. transgressor) was manipulated. Participants in the victim 
condition read: “Your colleague breaks your coffee mug by pushing it off your desk. You were 
very fond of this coffee mug.” Participants in the transgressor condition read: “You break your 
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colleague's coffee mug by pushing it off your colleague's desk. Your colleague was very fond of 
this coffee mug.” In the original scenario, Leunissen and colleagues specified whether the 
transgression was intentional or accidental; for the purposes of our study, we left the intention 
ambiguous because information about transgressor intention is rarely known to victims and such 
knowledge would diminish the likelihood that these predicted asymmetries would emerge. 
Measures.  We measured intent, guilt, and desires for forgiveness from victims’ and 
transgressors’ perspectives. 
Intentionality.  To measure intentionality, depending on condition, we asked participants, 
“How much was it your colleague's (your) intention to break the coffee mug?” (1-7 not at 
all/very much) depending on whether they were in the victim or transgressor condition.  
Guilt.  To measure the experience of guilt, we asked transgressors (victims), “How guilty 
would you (your colleague) feel about what happened?” Participants responded on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very guilty). 
Desires for Forgiveness.  Participants in the victim condition were asked 3 items: “How 
much would your colleague want you to tell them that you forgive them; want you to express 
forgiveness; like being told that they have been forgiven?” on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very much). Those in the transgressor condition were asked the same questions edited to 
reflect their perspective (e.g. “How much would you want your colleague to tell you that they 
forgive you?”). These items were combined into a composite measure of desires for forgiveness, 
α = .97. 
Results 
 Intentionality.  We conducted a one-way ANOVA and found a main effect of role on 
intentionality, F(1, 117) = 13.36, p < .001, d = .67, which was consistent with our hypothesis. 
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Victims thought the transgression was more intentional (M = 3.83, SD = 1.78) than transgressors 
(M = 2.50, SD = 2.17) reported it was.  
 Guilt. Also consistent with our prediction, victims (M = 4.93, SD = 1.46) estimated 
lower levels of transgressor guilt for transgressors than transgressors reported (M = 5.67, SD = 
1.72), F(1, 117) = 6.28, p = .014, d = .47. 
 Desire for Forgiveness.  Finally, we found a main effect of role on desires for 
forgiveness, F(1, 117) = 11.49, p = .001, d = .63. Victims (M = 4.74, SD = 1.64) gave lower 
estimates of how much transgressors wanted to be forgiven than transgressors did (M = 5.71, SD 
= 1.46).  
 Mediation Analyses. We tested for an effect of role on forgiveness through estimations 
of intentionality and guilt (see Figure 3) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples (Model 6; Hayes, 
2013). The bootstrap coefficient for the two-step mediation path was .22 and the 95% confidence 
interval did not include zero (.07 to .49).  
Discussion 
Study 3 again provides support for the notion that one’s role in a transgression – victim 
versus transgressor – is a critical determinant of how the involved parties subsequently think 
about it. Specifically, even when considering the same event, victims consistently read greater 
intent into the transgression than transgressors reported, believed that transgressors experienced 
less guilt than they did, and desired forgiveness less than transgressors reported desiring it.  
The method we used – a scenario – could be considered a strength and a weakness. On 
one hand, this method could be considered a strength because the manipulation of role was 
minimal, yet still yielded strong differences in attributions of intentionality, guilt, and desires for 
forgiveness. Furthermore, the severity of the transgression was held constant across conditions. 
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On the other hand, the short scenario may not have been particularly emotionally involving for 
participants. It therefore might not have yielded a strong sense of injustice, and more 
importantly, people’s beliefs about how they would respond might have differed from how they 
actually would respond. Furthermore, the paucity of detail in the scenarios could have led 
participants to fill in different contextual factors as a function of role assignment. In the next 
study, we attempt to retain the positive features of Study 3 while addressing some of its 
weaknesses.  
Study 4 
So far, we have evidence for our predicted effect for past transgressions and for an 
imagined transgression. The primary goal of Study 4 was to extend our test into the context of a 
transgression occurring in real time. To do this, we developed a new procedure in which 
transgressors would actually commit a transgression against a real participant, who would 
experience the associated negative consequences. Unlike many studies of transgressions in which 
either the victim or the transgressor is a confederate or a pre-programmed computer response 
(Reich & Hercovis, 2015; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014), both of our roles were real 
participants who interacted with one another. Further, just as in the real world, we wanted the 
transgressor’s true intentions not to be known to the victim. Finally, we wanted to hold constant 
the magnitude of the violation, so all transgressors committed the same harmful act. After 
victims had experienced the consequence of the transgression, we asked victims and 
transgressors to report transgressor intent, transgressor guilt and transgressor desire for 
forgiveness. We describe this procedure in detail below. 
Method 
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 The final sample contained 46 participants (23 dyads) (18 men, 28 women; Mage = 24.9 
years) recruited from a list maintained by a behavioral research lab at a university; those who 
participated in Study 2 were excluded from participation in this study. Each participant was paid 
£10 (~$15.55) for their participation. The final count does not include 16 dyads in which the 
participant in the transgressor role did not transgress (41% of the total sample). The procedure 
required transgressors to freely choose a course of action that would lead to a negative outcome 
for their partner, so the design inevitably meant that some transgressors would not choose the 
transgressing option (see design below).  
We invited two participants per timeslot into the lab to take part in what was advertised 
as a project management study. Participants were randomly assigned to their role (transgressor, 
victim) before their arrival (the experimenter verbally referred to them as Participants 1 and 2). 
Upon arrival, they were asked to sign a consent form that also gave background information 
about the study. On this form, participants received information indicating that Participant 1’s 
choice of task would affect Participant 2’s task allocation: If the Participant 1 chose Task 1 [Task 
3], their counterpart would have to perform Task 3 [Task 1], but if he or she chose Task 2, their 
counterpart would also perform Task 2. Although the interdependent nature of the transgressor’s 
choice was clearly stated on the consent form, we assumed that it would not be read by most 
participants, who often sign the form without reading it carefully (see Cryder et al., 2012). This 
would mean that most participants in the transgressor role would choose the desirable task, not 
knowing until afterwards that it would mean their partner would have to complete the 
undesirable task.  
 Both participants were then invited to sit in two rooms across the hall from one another, 
and were directed to fill out a series of unrelated questionnaires that we described as typical of 
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those given to employees when they first start a new job (the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), a scenario from Higgins, Rholes, & Jones (1977), the Big Five Inventory (John 
& Srivastava, 1999), and the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI: Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2003)). We asked participants to rate how long they thought it took them to fill out the 
questionnaires, and how enjoyable they thought this task was. This bolstered our cover story that 
we were interested in project management and the timing and enjoyment of tasks that people 
choose to do. This information was also built into the cover story later in the experiment. 
 At this point, the transgressor was presented with a sheet of paper describing three tasks 
and was invited to choose which task he/she wanted to do next. Task 1 was a measure of 
attention span (crossing out the letter ‘e’ from a long text of nonsense words); participants were 
told that it had previously been rated as not very enjoyable and took other participants 
approximately 35 minutes to complete. Task 2 was a series of questionnaires similar to those 
they had already completed, and participants were told it had previously been rated as enjoyable 
as most other lab studies and took others approximately 20 minutes to complete. Task 3 was 
described as a chocolate-sampling project in which participants would get to taste and rate three 
small pieces of chocolate. Participants were told others had rated it as highly enjoyable and that 
it took others approximately 5 minutes to complete. Thus, Task 3 was designed to be the most 
attractive option and Task 1 to be the least attractive option. We expected most transgressors to 
choose Task 3. 
We crafted and included the middle choice option so that choosing Task 3 would seem 
like a transgression by comparison. Based on the information they received about Task 2, it was 
presented as being as attractive as most lab studies, and as attractive as the initial tasks they had 
completed upon entering the lab. In this way, we assumed that Task 2 would be treated as the 
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default reference point, with a better task seen as a gain and a worse task seen as a loss 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Therefore, from the victim’s perspective, a partner who chose 
Task 3 would be committing a transgression because he/she would benefit at a cost to the victim, 
who would have to complete Task 1 as a result.  
The second way that including Task 2 served to emphasize that choosing Task 3 would 
be a transgression was by providing an option that would be equally attractive to both 
participants. Since victims knew this option was available to transgressors, then a transgressor 
who chose the most attractive task for himself (meaning the victim would have to complete the 
least attractive task) would be seen as transgressing. Without the middle option, transgressors 
would be faced with harming themselves or harming the victim, so choosing the attractive one 
for themselves would seem more like a reasonable choice more than a transgression. 
After transgressors made their choice of task, they were told, “You were previously 
informed that the task you chose to complete would influence what the other participant would 
do.” At this point, they were presented with a matrix summarizing how each option affected the 
other participant, which reinforced the implications of their decision for the victim. They were 
then asked to wait while the experimenter informed the victim of their choice.  
While victims waited for the transgressor to choose, they were presented with a 
description of Tasks 1, 2 and 3. After the transgressor chose, victims were informed of the 
outcome and what task they would complete. They were also told, “The other participant was 
previously informed that the task you would complete would depend on what he/she chose to 
do.” Then they were presented with the matrix summarizing how each option presented to the 
transgressor affected the victim.  
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In sum, we purposefully designed the study in such a way that there would be no 
deception involved. All participants received the same information and the transgressors’ choice 
was honestly communicated to the victim. At the same time, we attempted to model real 
transgressions, leaving substantial room for transgressors and victims to vary in their perceptions 
of intent. We included in the final sample only dyads in which the transgressor chose to do Task 
3, thus allocating Task 1 (the unattractive task) to their victims. Finally, all participants actually 
did the tasks they had chosen to do (or that were chosen for them); in this way, all transgressors 
in the final sample actually transgressed and all victims were actually victimized by their 
transgressors.  
Measures 
After the tasks had been completed, participants were asked to report which task they had 
done, which task their partner had done, and to rate their enjoyment of the task they had 
completed and how much they thought their counterpart enjoyed their task (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much). These items were asked to support our cover story about project management and 
also served as a manipulation check of their enjoyment of each task.  
Since some methodologists advise against single-item measures (e.g., Nunnally, 
Bernstein, & Berge 1967, although see Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007 and Loo, 2002), we used two 
items to probe intent, guilt, and forgiveness in Study 2. To measure of intent, we asked, “How 
much did you want your counterpart to do the task they did?” and “How much did you intend for 
your counterpart to do the task they did?”, r(46) = .69, p < .001). To measure guilt, we asked, 
“How bad do you feel that your counterpart had to do the task that they did?” and “How guilty 
do you feel that your counterpart had to do the task that they did?”, r(46) = .82, p < .001. Finally, 
to measure desires for forgiveness, we asked, “How much would you want your counterpart to 
Impediments to Forgiveness 31 
forgive you for making them do the task they did?” and “How much would you like being told 
that you’ve been forgiven for making your counterpart do the task they did?”, r(46) = .72, p < 
.001. All items were asked on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very).
3
   
Results 
Because victims and transgressors interacted with one another from the start of the study, 
we needed to account for variance that could be attributed to the dyad. Therefore, we conducted 
multilevel modeling to test our hypotheses, and we again report R
2
 for each effect as proposed by 
Bryk & Raudenbush (1992). 
Enjoyment of Tasks.  In the final sample, all transgressors did the chocolate-tasting task 
and all victims did the tedious task. Transgressors rated their task as more enjoyable (M = 6.17, 
SD = 1.14) than victims rated their tedious task (M = 2.26, SD = 1.57), B = 3.91, SE(B) = .37, p 
< .001, R
2
 = .71. Victims also thought their counterpart enjoyed their chocolate-tasting task (M = 
6.26, SD = .81) more than transgressors thought their counterpart enjoyed their tedious task (M = 
2.13, SD = 1.22), B = -4.13, SE(B) = .28, p < .001, R
2
 = .82, indicating that victims thought their 
counterpart was enjoying themselves while they were not, and that transgressors thought their 
victim was miserable while they were enjoying themselves.  
Intent, Guilt, and Desires for Forgiveness.  As hypothesized, victims overestimated 
how much transgressors intended to make them do the harmful task, B = -2.41, SE(B) = .39, p < 
.001, R
2
 = .50, and underestimated how guilty transgressors felt, B = 2.10, SE(B) = .35, p < .001, 
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 At the end of the study, we asked participants whether they had read on the consent form that 
Participant 2 would have to do the task Participant 1 did not choose (an item which we asked 
among four other items ostensibly designed to test participants’ recall of certain features of the 
study). Of the 23 dyads, 60.9% of victims and 21.7% of transgressors indicated that they were 
aware of this information, 2(1, N = 46) = 7.26, p = .007. We interpret this result as a 
combination of transgressors’ self-serving desires to avoid blame for the transgression and 
victims desire to be seen as attentive to all study materials.  
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R
2
 = .60. Victims also underestimated how much transgressors wanted to be forgiven, B = .67, 
SE(B) = .44, p = .122, R
2
 = .05, although this was not significant. We report the means for these 
measures in Table 2. 
Having found that role predicts differences in estimates of intent and guilt, but not 
forgiveness, we note that it is possible for mediation to occur even if the initial predictor variable 
(role) does not have a total effect on the outcome variable (forgiveness; Kenny, Kashy, & 
Bolger, 1998). Therefore, as in Study 2, we tested sequential mediation in MPlus (see Figure 4) 
to test the effect of role on desires for forgiveness through intent and guilt and to nest these 
measures within each dyad. We conducted this analysis after performing a log transformation on 
the intent measure so that the residuals were normal. The bootstrap coefficient was -.45 (SE = 
.17) and the 95% CI excluded zero (-.89 to -.01). Thus, we concluded that there was an effect of 
role on intent and guilt, and that the role-based difference in intent is associated with role-based 
difference in perceptions of guilt and, subsequently, desires for forgiveness.  
Discussion 
In this study, we developed a new procedure in which transgressing participants caused 
harm to victim participants in a laboratory setting. Furthermore, as in Study 3, the magnitude of 
the transgression was held constant. We replicated the findings from Studies 1-3: victims 
overestimated how much transgressors intended to transgress, and underestimated how much 
transgressors felt guilty, which were associated with different estimates of desires for 
forgiveness.  
One limitation of this study is the relatively small sample size. Because of the expense 
associated with this procedure, and the robustness of the effect demonstrated in the prior studies, 
we recruited a smaller-than-normal sample. We expected the vast majority of transgressors to 
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choose Task 3. However, a larger percentage than we expected (41%) chose one of the other 
tasks, which further decreased the number of participants in each condition. Although the 
predicted effects emerged, we are cognizant of the problems associated with small cell sizes 
(Button et al., 2013). The robustness of the effect across the other studies gives us confidence 
that we are not detecting a false effect. 
The fact that 41% of participants did not choose the transgression option also suggests a 
possible concern regarding generalizability. That is, it could be that the effect would only emerge 
for the type of individuals who chose the transgression option. Since the effect emerged across 
the other studies, which included large, diverse samples of individuals considering both actual 
and imagined transgressions, it would appear that the effect is not due to selection bias. 
In many ways, the results of Studies 1-4 provide disheartening news: The fact that 
victims underestimate how much transgressors desire forgiveness implies that many relationships 
that could be repaired by forgiveness are not. In the final study, we investigated a possible 
remedy to this miscalibration in an effort to overcome this barrier to reconciliation. 
 
Study 5 
Our goal in Study 5 was to investigate a remedy to the asymmetry that would yield more 
equivalent interpretations between victims and transgressors. To do this, we asked victims to 
empathize with transgressors. Some research has shown that perspective-taking (which includes 
empathy; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006) can help a person to adjust away from 
one’s egocentric anchor (Epley, Keysar, Van Broven, & Gilovich, 2004; Regan & Totten, 1975). 
We reasoned that this process would therefore better align victims’ beliefs about transgressors’ 
desires for forgiveness with transgressors’ actual desires for forgiveness.  
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Method 
 Participants.  The final sample for this study was 141 participants: 41 men, 100 women, 
Mage = 29.17 years;) participants were from a pool maintained by a behavioral research lab in the 
United Kingdom. The study was advertised via a link in an email that participants could click to 
participate. As payment, we held a lottery for four £25 Amazon.co.uk gift cards.  
 Procedure.  Participants read the same scenario about a broken mug used in Study 1. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: transgressor, victim-control, or 
victim-empathy. The victim-control and transgressor conditions were the same as in Study 1, but 
participants in the victim-empathy condition were given the scenario and also an empathy 
manipulation adapted from Regan and Totten (1975). Victims were told: “While you are 
imagining this scenario, please try to empathize with John. Imagine how John feels as this 
occurs. Picture to yourself just how he feels in this situation. You are to concentrate on the way 
he feels. Think about his reaction to you. In your mind's eye, you are to visualize how it feels to 
be John in this situation. On the next page, you will be asked about John's behavior.”4  
 Measures.  We measured intent, guilt, and desires for forgiveness (α = .77) as in Study 1.  
Results 
The logic underlying our predictions was that, through the process of empathizing with 
transgressors, victims would shift toward seeing the transgression as the transgressor does, 
thereby diminishing the asymmetry. We therefore conducted three planned contrasts. First, we 
compared transgressor responses to victim-control responses to test whether the basic predicted 
asymmetry emerged, as in the previous studies. Second, we tested whether victim-control and 
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 We also randomly assigned a group of participants to a transgressor-empathy condition, but we 
later realized that, theoretically, we would not expect empathizing with the victim to affect a 
transgressor’s experience of his own guilt or his/her own desire for forgiveness. We therefore did 
not include this condition in the analyses for this study.  
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victim-empathy participants reported different responses to our dependent variables. We 
predicted that empathizing victims would report less transgressor intent, greater transgressor 
experience of guilt, and a greater transgressor desire for forgiveness compared to control-victims. 
Third, we tested the size of the asymmetry between transgressors and victim-empathy 
participants. This effect should be smaller than the effect emerging in the first contrast. See 
Table 3 for all means and mean differences.  
 Intent. We conducted a one-way ANOVA and found a significant effect of condition on 
ascribed intent, F(2, 138) = 10.79, p < .001, 2 = .14. Planned contrasts revealed that victims in 
the control condition made higher estimates of how intentional the mug-breaking was relative to 
transgressors, t(138)= 4.62, p < .001, d = 1.09. Second, victims in the control condition attributed 
greater intent to the transgressor than empathizing victims did, t(138) = 1.82, p = .071, d = .33, 
although this was only marginally significant.  Finally, empathizing victims made greater 
estimates of the intentionality of the mug-breaking, relative to transgressors, t(138) = 2.72, p = 
.007, d = .69, although as expected, this contrast was weaker than the transgressor vs. control 
victim contrast.  
 Guilt.  A one-way ANOVA demonstrated a significant effect of condition on guilt, F(2, 
138) = 4.94, p = .008, 2 = .07. According to planned contrasts, victims in the control condition 
gave lower estimates of how guilty transgressors felt than transgressors reported feeling, t(138) = 
3.14, p = .002, d = .68, replicating the results from the prior studies. Second, victims in the 
control condition did not think the transgressor felt less guilt than empathizing victims did, 
t(138) = 1.38, p = .170, d = .26, although the means were in the direction predicted. Finally, 
empathizing victims did not differ from transgressors in terms of guilt, t(138) = 1.71, p = .090, d 
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= .38, demonstrating that the transgressor-victim asymmetry was reduced when victims were 
asked to empathize.  
 Desires for Forgiveness.  There was a marginally significant effect of condition on 
desires for forgiveness, F(2, 138) = 2.98, p = .054, 2 = .04. Control-condition victims made 
lower estimates of how much transgressors wanted to be forgiven than transgressors did, t(138) = 
2.14, p = .034, d = .45, consistent with prior studies. Second, victims in the control condition 
thought the transgressor wanted to be forgiven less than empathizing victims, t(138) = 2.08, p = 
.040, d = .41. Third, empathizing victims did not differ from transgressors in terms of desires for 
forgiveness, t(138) = .03, p = .975, d = .01, again supporting our predictions.  
Mediation Analyses.  As in the previous studies, we conducted a 2-step analysis of the 
indirect effect of role on forgiveness through intent and guilt (see Figure 5) again using a 
sequential mediation model (PROCESS Model 6; Hayes, 2013). First, we compared the victim-
control condition to the victim-empathy condition (controlling for the transgressor condition) 
because we thought that empathizing victims would have a similar psychology to transgressors. 
We found that the indirect effect through intent and guilt on forgiveness was not supported 
(bootstrap coefficient with 5,000 samples = .05, 95% CI (-.003 to .23). As this was a strong test 
of our hypothesis, we ran a second mediation model, comparing the victim-control condition 
against the victim-empathy and transgressor conditions (combined). We found evidence for an 
effect through intent and guilt on forgiveness (bootstrap coefficient with 5,000 samples = -.10, 
95% CI (-.31 to -.02)). This replicates the causal chain found in our earlier studies: compared to 
both transgressors and victims who empathized with transgressors, victims in the control 
condition again made higher estimates of how much transgressors intended to break the mug 
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than transgressors did, which in turn yielded lower estimations of how guilty transgressors felt 
and how much they wanted to be forgiven.  
Discussion 
 It appears that an effective remedy to asymmetric attributions lies in asking victims to 
empathize with transgressors. In addition to introducing a potential remedy to the asymmetry, 
these results also draw attention to the very nature of problem: that of the psychological power of 
social roles in influencing interpretations of transgressions (see also Baumeister & Catanese, 
2001). Despite the fact that people likely have experience as both victims and transgressors, it 
seems they do not spontaneously apply this knowledge when inhabiting a given role (see also 
Flynn, 2011). One implication is that an effective intervention for conflict mediation and dispute 
resolution is to induce empathetic perspective-taking, thus opening the door to all of the potential 
benefits of forgiveness.  
General Discussion 
 It seems that transgressors want forgiveness more than victims realize. Historical 
transgressions, transgressions that occurred on the same day, scenario-based transgressions, and 
transgressions that occurred in a laboratory setting all revealed the same finding: victims impute 
greater intent, less guilt, and reduced desires for forgiveness on transgressors than transgressor 
report experiencing. Furthermore, it is the asymmetry in intent that causes the asymmetry in guilt 
and ultimately leads victims to believe transgressors do not want forgiveness when they actually 
do. We tested alternative parameterizations of this mediation model (the results are reported in 
the Supplementary Online Materials) and found that this causal model was the most consistent 
across all studies. At the same time, Study 5 provided some hope of fixing this damaging 
miscalibration: we found that victim empathy for transgressors attenuated the effect.  
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Contributions and Future Directions 
Transgressions and Forgiveness. The primary contribution of our findings is a better 
understanding of the dynamics that help or hinder the forgiveness process. Specifically, we have 
identified what could be described as a fundamental “inefficiency” in the relationship repair 
process. Transgressors seek forgiveness more than victims realize, suggesting that victims might 
withhold forgiveness when it could repair the relationship. This asymmetry arises from the very 
nature of transgressions: victims and transgressors inhabit different roles in the situation, and 
therefore appraise it differently.  
To investigate this phenomenon, we employed a method that considers both victim and 
transgressor reactions to the transgression (Leunissen et al., 2013; Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del 
Priore, 2008). In general, research on forgiveness has generally tended to adopt the perspective 
of the victim, studying the antecedents of its expression (Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010). Some 
have studied transgressors’ reactions to being forgiven (Adams, Zou, Inesi, & Pillutla, 2015; 
Struthers, Eaton, Shirvani, Georghiou, & Edell, 2008), but few have researched whether and how 
victims and transgressors diverge in their perspectives on forgiveness and how this bears on 
relationship repair. One exception is in the close relationships literature, where some forgiveness 
researchers have conducted studies on intimate partners (e.g., Friesen, Fletcher & Overall, 2005) 
or all family members (e.g., Maio et al., 2008). However, these studies did not investigate role-
based differences in perceptions of the same construct (e.g., transgressor guilt) and the roles that 
were analyzed were gender or family roles. To the extent that both victim and transgressor 
perspectives are studied simultaneously, this new lens on relationship repair could lead to better 
calibration of victims’ and transgressors’ repair strategies, thus improving ‘efficiency’ within 
justice restoration and conflict resolution.  
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A related contribution of this paper is the development of a laboratory paradigm in which 
one participant commits a real transgression against another participant (Study 4). It is 
notoriously difficult to get participants to transgress in the lab. For transgressors to do so against 
a real victim adds a further level of complexity, which is why most paradigms use confederates. 
Although ours is an admittedly expensive paradigm since some of the participants choose not to 
transgress, we think it provides an effective means for researchers to study real-time 
transgressions from the perspective of both parties involved. 
Our findings also contribute to recent work documenting the differing needs of victims 
and perpetrators. Following transgressions, victims face status-based threats whereas perpetrators 
experience concerns about their moral reputations (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). According to this 
research, victims want their transgressors to accept responsibility whereas perpetrators want 
social reacceptance and for victims to understand their perspective. Our evidence that 
perpetrators want to be forgiven aligns with Shnabel and Nadler’s argument that perpetrators 
desire reacceptance, but we extend this research by further documenting that victims do not 
appreciate this desire. Indeed, offering forgiveness may even be experienced as a loss of power 
and/or status for victims as they give up their victimhood and their right to claim further 
reparations (Exline & Baumeister, 2000; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). 
The findings from Study 5 suggest that empathizing may be one way to for victims to recognize 
the extent to which transgressors desire forgiveness. Whether this would overcome their 
concerns with power or status loss and stimulate forgiveness is a question best left for future 
research.  
To date, forgiveness researchers have tended to study either intrapsychic forgiveness or 
interpersonally-communicated forgiveness (Exline & Baumeister, 2000), but less is known about 
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how highly the psychological experience of forgiveness correlates with its social expression. Our 
research highlights this disconnect by suggesting that victims may feel forgiveness and may even 
want to express it, but may be inhibited from doing so if they think transgressors do not desire it. 
More generally, studying how much victims’ intrapsychic forgiveness aligns with transgressors’ 
beliefs about how much they have been forgiven (in the absence of a direct expression) could be 
another way to shed light on this asymmetry. 
Guilt has often been discussed in the self-conscious emotions literature vis-à-vis shame: 
transgressors report feeling guilt when they negatively evaluate their moral transgressions, 
whereas shame pertains to a negative global evaluation of the self (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & 
Insko, 2011; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). This begs the question of 
whether victims accurately understand how much shame transgressors feel. People tend to be 
their own harshest critics, evaluating themselves more negatively (e.g. as more morally wrong, 
having let others down) than they believe others do (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). 
This would suggest that victims underestimate transgressor shame in addition to transgressor 
guilt. Our focus on guilt was driven by our interest in forgiveness: guilt tends to yield greater 
motivations to repair relationships to forgive than shame does (Baumeister, Stillwell, & 
Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, 1991). At the same time, if the source of shame is addressable, it 
may also motivate repair. Indeed, people experiencing shame do sometimes report a desire to 
make amends (Keltner & Harker, 1998). Thus, two interesting avenues for future research would 
be 1) to test whether the asymmetry between victims and transgressors emerges for shame, and 
2) whether differences in shame drive asymmetric beliefs about transgressor desires for 
forgiveness. 
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Finally, a fruitful avenue for future research may be to study other fundamental 
asymmetries between victims and transgressors after harm or wrongdoing occurs. For example, 
transgressors might provide different estimates of victims’ desires for compensation and 
remuneration than victims do. If victims view transgressors’ actions as more intentional, they 
might desire more compensation than transgressors offer. However, if transgressors feel guiltier 
than victims predict, then they might offer more compensation than victims expect. Relatedly, 
the field is ripe for investigation into asymmetric perceptions of apology expressions (Leunissen 
et al., 2013), beliefs in the appropriateness of punishment and retributive justice, the 
deservingness of reparations, and other forms of justice restoration.  
Actor-Observer Asymmetries. By adopting a social exchange perspective on 
transgressions, the current research also provides a noteworthy extension to the idea that social 
roles govern perceptions and attributions (e.g. Flynn & Lake, 2008; Gneezy & Epley, 2014; 
Keysar, Converse, Wang, & Epley, 2008; Zhang & Epley, 2012). Whether givers or receivers, 
actors or observers, or victims and transgressors, an important implication of this research is that 
victims and perpetrators - just as other people in these social roles - are not different kinds of 
people. Social roles govern the way victims and transgressors perceive the injustice and 
contribute to their asymmetric perceptions. Although research has theorized about differences 
between victims’ and transgressors’ perceptions (e.g. Baumeister & Catanese, 2001), we have 
conducted an empirical test of these asymmetries.  
We build on and develop these theories about social roles by examining not just 
asymmetries in perceptions of transgressions (e.g. Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990), but 
also asymmetries in expectations following transgressions regarding forgiveness. This research 
thus makes an important contribution to the research on perspective-taking in judgment and 
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decision-making by demonstrating the important effects of social roles and how they govern not 
just perceptions of conflict, but also beliefs about how to respond to and resolve conflict. By 
highlighting this asymmetry, we attempt to inform a debate within the justice literature about the 
best way to respond to interpersonal transgressions. Forgiveness is helpful when it comes to 
resolving conflicts, but it may not lead to resolution if both parties do not share similar 
expectations about how much it is desired.  
Finally, our findings also provide support for the idea that active observers – like passive 
observers - evince the actor-observer asymmetry. Jones and Nisbett (1971) hypothesized that the 
asymmetry between actors and observers in attributions for behavior would emerge when the 
observers were involved in the interaction, and that the asymmetry would be stronger for active 
rather than passive observers. Some early research provided support for this proposition with 
either brief scenarios (Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979) or with a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Miller & Norman, 1975). Here, we contribute to this literature by 
finding support for the original proposition in the context of rich, real-world transgressions.  
Is Repair the Responsibility of the Victim? 
One important implication of our findings is that there are missed opportunities for 
conflict repair. If victims make lower estimates of transgressors’ desires for forgiveness than 
transgressors do, they may fail to express the very sentiments that have the capacity to repair a 
relationship and enable both parties to move forward. This suggests that victims may be missing 
an opportunity to amend their relationships with transgressors, and that conflict resolution may 
only be a step away.  
However, we hesitate to suggest that an appropriate blanket remedy to this problem is for 
victims to increase their expressions of forgiveness, or to always empathize with their 
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transgressors. For a variety of reasons, victims may not want to repair their relationships with 
transgressors – even if transgressors desire forgiveness. Transgressions may not be forgivable or 
victims may decide that maintaining their victim status is preferable to offering forgiveness 
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Furthermore, victims often report experiencing self-blame and doubt 
when they are transgressed against (Branscombe, Wohl, Owen, Allison, & N’gbala, 2010; Miller 
& Porter, 1983). Therefore, encouraging people to offer forgiveness, especially when it is not 
sincerely felt, might entail victims’ sacrificing their feelings of self-worth in order to save a 
relationship. Instead, what we would like to communicate in our work is that victims may often 
be unaware of how much their transgressor wants forgiveness. To the extent that this variable is 
important to victims in determining whether to offer forgiveness (Adams & Inesi, 2016), then we 
hope our results will serve to hasten relationship repair under such circumstances.  
Another potential resolution would be for transgressors to better communicate their 
desire for forgiveness. In the Supplemental Online Materials, we describe a study in which we 
tested the effect of transgressor apologies on this asymmetry. Although an apology did not 
diminish the asymmetry, it did increase victims’ beliefs that transgressors want forgiveness. In 
addition to or instead of offering an apology, transgressors could ask for forgiveness directly. 
Alternatively, they could go further back in the causal chain and explain to the victim how the 
transgression was not intentional or express how guilty they feel. These possibilities would 
benefit from future research. 
Conclusion 
 Across five studies, we find that victims and transgressors are miscalibrated in their 
beliefs about transgressors’ intent and guilt. One critical implication of these asymmetric 
attributions is that victims underestimate transgressors’ desires for forgiveness. Although we 
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have argued that these social roles serve as barriers to resolving conflicts, by identifying this 
obstacle and empathy as a possible solution to it, we have made progress toward enabling these 
two parties to move beyond the transgression through forgiveness.  
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Figure 1. The relationships between victim and transgressor role, intent, guilt, and forgiveness, 
Study 1. Coefficients are unstandardized.  
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Figure 2. The relationships between victim and transgressor role, intent, guilt, and forgiveness, 
Study 2. Coefficients are unstandardized.  
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Figure 3. The relationships between victim and transgressor role, intent, guilt, and forgiveness, 
Study 3. Coefficients are unstandardized.  
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Figure 4. The relationships between victim and transgressor role, intent, guilt, and forgiveness, 
Study 4. Coefficients are unstandardized.  
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Figure 5. The effect of control condition victims compared to transgressors and victims who 
empathized with transgressors on intent, guilt, and forgiveness, Study 5. Coefficients are 
unstandardized.  
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Table 1 
Mean Intent, Guilt, and Desires for Forgiveness by Role, Study 2 
 
  
Role 
 
  
Victim (n = 144)* 
 
Transgressor (n = 113)* 
 
 
Intent 
 
2.74 (1.91) 
 
1.93 (1.62) 
 
Guilt 
 
2.99 (1.88) 
 
4.51 (2.16) 
 
Desires for Forgiveness 
 
 
2.93 (1.83) 
 
4.44 (1.79) 
Note.  Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.  
* indicates the number of transgressions reported by each condition.  
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Table 2 
Mean Intent, Guilt, and Desires for Forgiveness by Role, Study 4 
 
 
 
Role 
 
 
Victim 
 
 
Transgressor 
 
 
Intent 
 
3.85 (1.90) 1.43 (0.84) 
 
Guilt 
 
2.98 (1.51) 5.09 (1.61) 
 
Desires for Forgiveness 
 
3.96 (1.36) 4.63 (1.64) 
Note.  Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Mean Intent, Guilt, and Desires for Forgiveness by Role, Study 5 
 
 
Condition 
 
Dependent Measure 
Victim Control 
 
Victim Empathy 
 
Transgressor 
 
 
Intent (1-7) 
 
2.90 (2.09)a 2.24 (1.96)b 1.27 (0.89)c 
 
Guilt (1-7) 
 
5.08 (1.64)a 5.51 (1.63)ab 6.04 (1.18)b 
 
Forgiveness (1-7) 
 
5.13 (1.25)a 5.65 (1.28)b 5.66 (1.14)b 
Note.  Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Means with different subscripts within 
each row differ significantly from one another at p < .05 (or in the case of intent between the two 
victim conditions, p = .07).  
 
 
